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Stress Testing During Stressful Times: How COVID-19
Could Influence the Role of Stress Testing and
Prudential Financial Regulation
I. INTRODUCTION
Often, we ask ourselves whether we can predict the future. While
a few predicted some sort of global pandemic, most never expected it to
occur within their lifetime.1 If most people could not have predicted such
an outbreak, should we expect any more from our banking system? In
2008, the answer was no.2 When the 2008 Financial Crisis devastated the
housing market and economy, banks were not prepared, resulting in the
worst economic disaster since the Great Depression. 3
To strengthen the U.S. banking system for the future, Congress
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in 2010.4 Among its innovations were mandated
stress tests, models that help analyze banks’ capital positions under harsh
economic conditions.5 The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program
(“SCAP”), in place before the passage of Dodd-Frank, pioneered the first
use of stress tests for the nineteen institutions with assets in excess of
$100 billion.6 Before these institutions were permitted to repay their
1. See Hillary Hoffower, Bill Gates Has Been Warning of a Global Health Threat For
Years. Here Are 12 People Who Seemingly Predicted the Coronavirus Pandemic., BUS.
INSIDER (Dec. 15, 2020, 10:36AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/people-whoseemingly-predicted-the-coronavirus-pandemic-2020-3
[https://perma.cc/ALD3-4LSA]
(inferring that only a few individuals predicted the COVID-19 pandemic and its lasting
impacts).
2. See Martin Neil Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, BROOKINGS (Nov. 24,
2008),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-origins-of-the-financial-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/AQZ5-BR5C] (noting the reasons for the financial crisis, such as how the
banks were not adequately capitalized to endure a financial crisis).
3. Id.
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 6, 12
U.S.C. § 5300 (2018).
5. Dodd-Frank § 6, 12 U.S.C. § 5365.
6. See Tim P. Clark & Lisa H. Ryu, CCAR and Stress Testing as Complementary
Supervisory
Tools,
FED.
RES.
BD.
(June
24,
2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/ccar-and-stress-testing-as-complementarysupervisory-tools.htm [https://perma.cc/96ZQ-RQJ5] (providing a detailed history of the
creation of SCAP, the first stress test program to evaluate the strength of banks’ capital against
harsh economic scenarios).
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Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) funding and rid themselves of
the government as a preferred shareholder, they needed to pass the stress
test or raise the additional capital7 needed to pass the stress test.8 These
tests were critical to restoring confidence in the U.S. banking system in
the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis.9 Inspired by the success of
SCAP, the Dodd-Frank Act set forth the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests
(“DFAST”) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board
System (“Federal Reserve Board”) created the Comprehensive Capital
Analysis and Review Program (“CCAR”) to analyze the capital of banks
on an annual basis.10
Over time, CCAR and DFAST underwent a variety of changes,
and have since deviated from their original purpose.11 The COVID-19
pandemic was the first true test of CCAR and DFAST, and what resulted
was confusion and concern about the state of the U.S. banking system.12
Conversely, stress tests are essential to maintaining confidence in the
U.S. banking system and help banks safely conserve capital to prepare
for future economic crises.13 COVID-19 did not reveal the weaknesses
in the banking system, but instead highlighted the flaws of the CCAR and
DFAST process during another financial crisis. 14 Therefore, the Federal
Reserve Board should learn from the past, seek global influence, and

7.
See Marshall Hargrave, Capital, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capital.asp [https://perma.cc/73R5-GFXZ] (defining
capital as the composition of equity, borrowing and investments that allow for a bank to
operate its business).
8. See Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Information, FED. RES. BD. (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/tarpinfo.htm [https://perma.cc/JS98-VYK9]
(providing a brief overview of the TARP program).
9. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (discussing the importance of SCAP, the first stress test
program to evaluate the strength of banks’ capital against harsh economic scenarios).
10. Dodd-Frank § 6, 12 U.S.C. § 5365.
11. Id. (noting the regulatory changes over time, such as raising the CCAR minimum
capital requirement from $50 to $250 billion); see also Clark & Ryu, supra note 6, at 1
(referencing several of the changes that CCAR and DFAST have experienced overtime).
12. See Rob Blackwell, Virus is Dodd-Frank's First Real Test, AM. BANKER (Mar. 13,
2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/coronavirus-is-dodd-franks-firstreal-test [https://perma.cc/QC5T-A4WG] (stating how Dodd-Frank will likely be impacted
by the economic wave that COVID-19 will have on the banking system).
13. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (detailing the value and purpose of stress testing within
the U.S. economy).
14. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Are We Seeing the Demise of Stress-Testing?, BROOKINGS (June
25,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/25/stress-testing/
[https://perma.cc/FR2B-JB5T] (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve
Board’s confusing 2020 release of bank stress-tests).
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reimplement the flexible, procedural response of SCAP that helped
restore confidence in the U.S. banks in 2009.15
This Note discusses the development of stress testing and
analyzes how COVID-19 has further shaped the arguments for and
against this regulatory framework. This discussion ultimately leads to the
conclusion that while the stress test programs have encouraged big banks
to remain better capitalized over time, many of the beneficial procedural
aspects of stress tests have since been weakened, reducing the credibility
of the programs. This Note Proceeds in five parts. Part II highlights the
Dodd-Frank Act regulatory framework that led to the development of
CCAR and DFAST, while noting the subtle differences between the two
programs.16 Part III then examines the impact of COVID-19 on the
release of the annual stress tests and considers how both the Federal
Reserve Board and the public have reacted to the Federal Reserve
Board’s actions.17 Part IV provides alternatives to performing stress tests
during a global pandemic and other periods of market stress and crisis.18
Finally, Part V concludes by restating the necessity of proper procedural
standards upon both the performance and release of the annual stress test
programs. 19
II. WHAT ARE CCAR AND DFAST, AND WHY DO WE HAVE THEM?
A.

Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act

risk.20

Among the many reasons for the Financial Crisis in 2008 was
Risk21 rapidly increased in 2004 when the Securities and

15. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (stating how SCAP helped to restore confidence between
market participants and the U.S. banking system); see also Huw Jones & Francesco Canepa,
EU Delays Banks Stress Test, Eases Capital Rules on Coronavirus, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2020,
9:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-banks/eu-delays-banksstress-test-eases-capital-rules-on-coronavirus-idUSKBN20Z20W
[https://perma.cc/65F6KCQK] (noting the decrease in capital requirements instilled by the EU’s decision to postpone
stress testing in light of the pandemic).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See Joe Nocera, Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 2, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html
[https://perma.cc/6TNCV4RB] (emphasis added) (defining the risk taken on by big banks as an influential factor of
the 2008 Financial Crisis).
21. What is Risk?, U.S. SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/investing-basics/what-risk [https://perma.cc/7FP9-9SAS] (last visited Jan. 30,
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) loosened the net capital requirement. 22
Capital, in the commercial sense, is composed of equity contributed by
shareholders, retained earnings over time, and long-term funds.23 This
increased risk, in addition to the lending of subprime mortgages that
allowed big banks to profit from risky mortgage-backed securities,
ultimately led to the collapse of the U.S. economy in 2008. 24 The Great
Recession saw the U.S. unemployment rate peak at 10% in 2009 and the
failure of more than 450 commercial banks across the country. 25
In an immediate response to the 2008 Financial Crisis, Congress
passed the Dodd-Frank Act26 “to promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system.”27 The Act aims to protect consumers by preventing
banks from “abusive financial services practices” and “by ending
bailouts.”28 To further this purpose, the Act requires the Federal Reserve
Board to conduct and publicly disclose annual stress tests to help banks
determine whether they can continue lending to households and
businesses, even during a severe recession like that of 2008. 29 These
scenarios serve as a tool to help big banks measure their capital under
baseline, adverse, and severely adverse models. 30
Before the development of the CCAR and DFAST programs, the
Federal Reserve Board established SCAP in 2009.31 This program took
2021) (defining risk as “the degree of uncertainty and/or potential financial loss inherent in
an investment decision”).
22. See Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
2,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03sec.html
[https://perma.cc/FV3T-P5X5] (providing an overview of the reasons for the 2008 Financial
Crisis, including the loosened net capital requirement by the SEC in 2004).
23. See Hargrave, supra note 7 (defining capital).
24. See ERIN COGHLAN, ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY INST. FOR RES. ON LABOR AND
EMP’T, WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE GREAT RECESSION? (2018), https://irle.berkeley.edu/whatreally-caused-the-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/PY4M-54P5] (describing the various
factors that led to the 2008 Financial Crisis, such as the collapse of the housing market and
the lending of subprime mortgages).
25. Id.
26. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Dodd-Frank § 165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2010) (noting that there are annual stress
tests conducted by the Federal Reserve Board for companies with greater than $50 billion in
assets, now $250 billion after the Economic Growth Act of 2018, and company-run stress
tests for companies with greater than $10 billion in assets).
30. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (discussing the three scenarios that vary in harshness in
economic conditions that the Federal Reserve Board uses to determine the metrics for the
stress tests).
31. Id.
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place during the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis and aimed to
create simultaneous stress tests for the nineteen biggest bank holding
companies32 as they faced deteriorating conditions in the financial
markets.33 To ease concerns about the future of the U.S. economy, SCAP
required these banks to participate in a stress test based on economic
scenarios harsher than the 2008 Financial Crisis and publicly disclose
those results.34 The stress test measured whether these nineteen banks
had enough capital to absorb future losses while still being able to operate
under the harsh scenarios.35 Banks that failed the test were given one
month to develop a capital plan and six months to raise the necessary
amount of capital to meet their plan. 36 While ten of the nineteen banks
initially failed the stress test, almost all of them were able to meet their
capital plans within the required six months.37
In addition to providing economic stability to the markets, the
hastily-established SCAP also yielded several other important results.38
By publicly disclosing the stress test results of the nineteen largest bank
holding companies, the program created transparency between banks and
market participants.39 Additionally, this disclosure added credibility to
the process itself and helped ease fears about the financial health of the
big banks.40 In other words, SCAP helped to “restore confidence in the
U.S. banking system.”41
B.

The Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review Program

Inspired by the success of SCAP, the Federal Reserve Board
established the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review Program in
32. Cf. National Information Center, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL,
https://www.ffiec.gov/npw/Institution/TopHoldings [https://perma.cc/NX2J-SWDU] (last
visited Jan. 30, 2021) (providing a list of the current biggest bank holding companies—as
calculated by total assets—in the U.S.).
32. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (defining a bank holding company as a company that
either controls or owns one or more U.S. banks).
33. Id.
34. See id. (emphasizing that one of the successful elements of SCAP was to publicly
disclose the results of the stress tests).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id. (noting how SCAP restored confidence in the American public and helped banks
better manage their capital).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. (stating that the public disclosure element of the stress tests and honesty with
the public restored confidence in the banking system after such a devastating financial crisis).
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2010.42 While CCAR is complementary to DFAST, the programs use
different testing exercises while measuring similar data and
requirements. 43 CCAR is an annual exercise conducted by the Federal
Reserve Board that analyzes whether the capital plans and expected
capital distributions of big banks are sufficient to survive times of
economic and financial stress. 44 The program helps ensure that banks are
taking a forward-looking approach, in which they can restructure their
capital plans to make sure there is enough capital in place to continue
operations throughout times of economic stress.45 The tests are measured
by “post-stress capital ratios” that incorporate large bank holding
companies’ “planned capital action over the nine-quarter planning
horizon under their baseline scenario.”46 The stress tests help banks
gauge whether they would remain above the minimum capital
requirements with their baseline capital actions under stressful
conditions.47
CCAR has changed since its initial implementation.48 In its early
years, CCAR applied to bank holding companies with assets 49 of $50
billion or more, which at that time included the thirty biggest banks in the
United States.50 In 2019, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and
Consumer Protection Act (“EGRRCPA”) raised the threshold minimum
to $250 billion in total assets.51
Since its implementation, compliance with CCAR has helped
these banks secure large amounts of capital to protect themselves from
future economic crisis.52 For example, one of the key CCAR
42. See id. (providing a detailed history on the creation of CCAR, which acts as an annual
measuring tool of the capital adequacy of big banks).
43. Id.
44. See Stress Tests and Capital Planning, FED. RES. BD. (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/stress-tests-capital-planning.htm
[https://perma.cc/5WHZ-EFGA] (providing a brief overview of the CCAR program).
45. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6.
46. Id.
47. See id. (describing scenarios such as sharp changes in gross domestic product and the
unemployment rate).
48. See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act
(“EGRRCPA”), Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018) (detailing legislative changes to
the regulatory requirements of CCAR).
49. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.12 (2020) (defining the current asset threshold as the average total
consolidated assets of greater than $250 billion).
50. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6.
51. See 132 Stat. 1296 (describing a regulatory relief package that included the lessening
of the minimum capital requirement for CCAR testing).
52. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6.
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measurements is Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (“CET1”). 53 CET1
measures the obvious equity that a bank holds, such as its common stock,
treasury stock, retained earnings, and certain Accumulated Other
Comprehensive Income (“AOCI”), and compares it against the bank’s
risk-adjusted assets.54 For the eighteen banks that have participated in
CCAR since 2013, this ratio has doubled from 5.6% to 11.3%.55 Since
its establishment, CCAR has helped banks create better risk management
practices to ensure a healthy banking system.56
C.

The Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test Program

Like CCAR, the DFAST Program stemmed from the influence of
SCAP and was established in 2010.57 While its purpose is similar,
DFAST can be distinguished from CCAR in two ways. 58 First, DFAST
reaches a larger number of banks with a minimum asset threshold
requirement of $10 billion.59 On the other hand, CCAR’s initial $50
billion minimum asset threshold increased to $250 billion in 2018.60
Second, DFAST requires regulated banks to produce their own internal
stress test, instead of being directly conducted by the Federal Reserve
Board.61
DFAST, like CCAR, conducts annual supervisory tests under
three scenarios: baseline, adverse, and severely adverse. 62 The baseline
scenario measures a set of conditions that reflect the general views of
both the economic and financial outlook of the United States economy
with respect to the financial condition of a covered bank.63 The severely
adverse scenario entails conditions that are significantly more harsh than
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. (noting how banks have better managed their capital overtime due to the Dodd-

Frank and CCAR regulations).
57. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2018).
58. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6.
59. Dodd-Frank § 165(i), 12 U.S.C. 5365(i)(1).
60. Id.
61. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6.
62. See id. (stating the three scenarios of measurement under DFAST and CCAR).
63. 12 C.F.R. § 325.2(c) (2020) (“Covered bank means any state nonmember bank or state
savings association with average total consolidated assets calculated as required under this
part that are greater than $250 billion.”); see also 12 C.F.R. § 325.2(b) (2020) (defining the
baseline scenario of the Dodd-Frank stress tests).
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the baseline scenario and includes additional components such as trading
conditions.64
The more severe scenarios are not meant to forecast the future of
the United States economy like with the baseline test; rather, they provide
scenarios for a series of hypothetical sets of events designed to test the
resilience of banking organizations.65 The scenarios are composed of
twenty-eight variables, ranging from gross domestic product, stock
market prices, interest rates, and unemployment rates that are calculated
accordingly to the three economic models.66 In 2020, however, even the
most severe of scenarios proved to be less harsh than the economic
conditions brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic.67
III. CCAR AND DFAST IN 2020: THE IMPACT OF COVID-19
On January 1, 2020, the United States confirmed the first case of
COVID-19 within its borders.68 Thirty days later, the World Health
Organization declared a global health emergency. 69 As the pandemic
ensued, banks reacted slowly.70 For example, at the beginning of the
64. 12 C.F.R. § 325.2(j) (2020) (defining the severely adverse scenario under DFAST and
CCAR, but not including the adverse scenario in its statutory definition as the adverse scenario
constantly changes).
65. Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Releases Hypothetical Scenarios
for its 2020 Stress Test Exercises, FED. RESERVE, (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200206a.htm
[https://perma.cc/TF9Q-GMNZ] [hereinafter Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020 Stress Test
Exercises] (releasing the hypothetical metrics regarding the annual stress tests for 2020).
66. Id.
67. Press Release, Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Fed. Reserve, Statement
by
Vice
Chair
for
Supervision
Quarles
(June
25,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/quarles-statement-20200625c.htm
[https://perma.cc/SJ74-FAE2]; see also Unemployment Rate 16.1 Percent in Massachusetts,
4.5 Percent in Utah, in July 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF L. STAT.: ECON. DAILY (Aug. 27, 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2020/unemployment-rate-16-point-1-percent-inmassachusetts-4-point-5-percent-in-utah-in-july-2020.htm [https://perma.cc/H9C6-NXN5]
[hereinafter Unemployment Rate 16.1 Percent in Massachusetts] (explaining the sudden rises
in the unemployment rate due to COVID-19).
68. See Grace Hauck, Five Months in: A Timeline of How COVID-19 Has Unfolded in the
US, USA TODAY (June 23, 2020, 6:21
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/nation/2020/04/21/coronavirus-updates-how-covid-19-unfolded-u-stimeline/2990956001/ [https://perma.cc/GE4T-8DUA] (providing a detailed timeline of the
evolution of COVID-19 and its impact on the United States).
69. Id.
70. See Daphne Foreman, 6 Months In: How Banks and Bankers Are Responding to Covid19, FORBES (Sep. 11, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/banking/6-monthsin-how-banks-and-bankers-are-responding-to-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/W2WX-AGPU]
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pandemic, only a few banks posted COVID-19 notifications on their
website.71 Before long, however, several banks started to waive fees on
products and services relating to bank accounts, mortgages, and credit
cards. 72 As many borrowers began to struggle due to the immediate shut
down of businesses and the sudden increase of unemployment, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) encouraged banks to
work with these individuals and businesses to alleviate further
pressures. 73 Additionally, many banks shifted to mobile and online
banking, while also eliminating ATM fees and waiving early withdrawal
fees. 74
A.

The February 2020 Release of Stress Test Scenarios

On February 5, 2020, the Federal Reserve Board released the
hypothetical scenarios for the 2020 stress tests.75 Combining both CCAR
and DFAST, the Federal Reserve Board analyzed thirty-four big banks
with at least $100 billion in total assets.76 For 2020, the tests analyzed
the banks under the baseline and severely adverse scenario.77 Both the
baseline and severely adverse scenarios incorporated twenty-eight
variables subject to economic volatility, including the employment rate,
interest rates, stock market prices, and gross domestic product.78 Under
the severely adverse scenario, which included harsh conditions likened to
a severe global recession, the unemployment rate rose rapidly from 6.5%
to 10%, with additional stress in both the corporate debt and commercial
real estate markets.79

(noting how banks overtime implemented more online-based services, but not immediately
during the brunt of COVID-19).
71. See id. (noting how banks delayed in posting COVID-19 affected services on their
websites).
72. Id. (indicating that after a short delay, banks started to switch to online banking and the
new concerns of its customers).
73. See id. (indicating that after a short delay, banks started to switch to online banking to
address the concerns of their customers).
74. Id.
75. Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020 Stress Test Exercises, supra note 65.
76. Id.
77. See id. (leaving out the middle, adverse scenario, from the 2020 analyses); see also 12
C.F.R. § 325.2(b), (j) (2020) (defining the baseline and severely adverse scenarios used in the
stress tests).
78. Foreman, supra note 70.
79. Id.
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The test also incorporated global market influences. 80 Banks with
large trading operations had to incorporate a global market shock
component in which international markets were factored into their
analysis.81 These shock features included “heightened stress to trading
book exposures to leveraged loans,” and required that firms with
significant global trading provide a counterparty default scenario
component.82 This latter component measures the probability that the
other party involved in the trade may default on its obligation.83
Qualifying banks were required to submit their capital plans to
the Federal Reserve Board by April 6, with the results to be released by
June 30.84 However, as the banks prepared their capital plans for 2020 in
the following months, the original test was immediately rendered stale. 85
For example, the U.S. unemployment rate jumped from 4.5% in March
to 14.7% in April, exceeding the severely adverse scenario of 10% set out
in February for the 2020 stress test.86 As unemployment rapidly
increased and gross domestic product declined, the stress test became out
of touch with reality.87
B.

The June 2020 Results and the New Sensitivity Analysis

On June 25, 2020, the Federal Reserve Board released the results
of the 2020 stress test, along with a newly developed sensitivity analysis
in light of COVID-19.88 In its original release, the Federal Reserve Board
80. See id. (defining global market influences as heightened stress to trading book
exposures to leveraged loans and counterparty default scenarios, and including banks such as
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America and Wells Fargo).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Counterparty Risk, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (2020),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/capital-markets/financialmarkets/counterparty-risk/index-counterparty-risk.html [https://perma.cc/4V58-B8RE].
84. Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020 Stress Test Exercises, supra note 65.
85. See Tarullo, supra note 14 (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve
Board’s confusing 2020 release of bank stress tests).
86. Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020 Stress Test Exercises, supra note 65; see also
Unemployment Rate Rises to Record High 14.7 Percent in April 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF L.
STAT.: ECON. DAILY (May 13, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2020/unemploymentrate-rises-to-record-high-14-point-7-percent-in-april-2020.htm
[https://perma.cc/S2LUP3FT] (describing the rapid changes in unemployment due to COVID-19).
87. Tarullo, supra note 14.
88. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Releases Results of Stress
Tests for 2020 and Additional Sensitivity Analyses Conducted in Light of the Coronavirus
Event
(June
25,
2020),

2021]

STRESS TESTING AND COVID-19

307

briefly noted that the original February 2020 stress test under the severely
adverse model yielded similar metrics as the V-shaped recession and
recovery model, as discussed below, under the new sensitivity analysis.89
Additionally, the Federal Reserve Board stated that all of the banks
involved in the February 2020 test remained strongly capitalized under
both models.90
The Federal Reserve Board also conducted a new sensitivity
analysis in the aggregate to better align with the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic.91 The new test presented three downside scenarios: a Vshaped recession and recovery; a U-shaped recession and recovery; and
a W-shaped, double-dip recession. 92
In these scenarios, the
unemployment rate ranged between 15.6% and 19.5%, a significant jump
from the 10% maximum set for the severely adverse scenario presented
in February.93 Unemployment at these rates would likely cause
individuals to default on car loans, credit card debt, mortgages, and
student loans, further negatively affecting banks. 94
The new sensitivity analysis results were released in aggregate
for the thirty-four banks originally included in the February 2020
analysis, leaving out any bank-specific information.95 The results
revealed that the banks involved in the sensitivity analysis experienced
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200625c.htm
[https://perma.cc/P8MU-HZFE] [hereinafter Additional Sensitivity Analyses] (stating the
results of both the 2020 stress tests and the additional sensitivity analysis).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.; see also Sarah Hansen, U-Shape? V-Shape? Recovery Shapes Explained And What
They
Mean
For
America’s
Economy,
FORBES
(June
3,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahhansen/2020/06/03/u-shape-v-shape-recovery-shapesexplained-and-what-they-mean-for-americas-economy/?sh=6762a41125a5
[https://perma.cc/22S8-287K] (defining a V-shaped recession and recovery as one where the
economy bounces back quickly to the baseline, a U-shaped recession and recovery as one
where the economic damages lasts for a longer period of time before recovery, and a Wshaped recession and recovery as one where the economy recovers from one recession to only
fall into another before eventually reaching baseline recovery).
93. Additional Sensitivity Analyses, supra note 88; Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020
Stress Test Exercises, supra note 65.
94. See Maya Rodriguez Valladares, Rising Unemployment and Imminent Corporate
Defaults Will Hurt Banks’ Profitability and Capital, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://ww8w.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2020/03/26/rising-unemploymentand-imminent-corporate-defaults-will-hurt-banks-profitability-andcapital/?sh=33955079654b [https://perma.cc/4884-ZMFH] (discussing the impacts that sharp
changes in the unemployment rate could have on the U.S. economy).
95. Additional Sensitivity Analyses, supra note 88.
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aggregate loan losses ranging from $560 to $700 billion and capital ratios
declined from 12% in the fourth quarter of 2019 to between 7.7% and
9.5%.96 Under both the U and W-shaped scenarios, most of the banks
involved remain well capitalized but several would approach their
minimum capital levels.97 Even so, Vice Chair Randal Quarles stated that
“the results of our sensitivity analysis show that our banks can remain
strong in the face of even the harshest shocks.” 98
In response to these results, the Federal Reserve Board took
several actions to ensure that the banks remain well-capitalized even with
the economic uncertainty of COVID-19.99 For the third quarter of 2020,
the Federal Reserve Board required that banks preserve capital by
suspending share purchases and capping dividend payments, while only
allowing the distribution of dividends according to an income-based
formula.100 Additionally, banks were required to resubmit their capital
plans in October 2020.101
Shortly following the release of the new sensitivity analysis
scenarios, the Federal Reserve Board also announced new capital
requirements for the big banks effective October 1, 2020.102 The metrics
are individualized to each bank, however the minimum CET1 Capital
Ratio for all banks is 4.5%.103 Additionally, the stress capital buffer,
which is a way to ensure that banks have extra usable capital against
losses, must be at least 2.5%.104 Finally, eight of the thirty-four big U.S.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. (including actions such as capping dividend payments and suspending share

purchases to ensure banks are adequately protecting their capital).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Announces Individual Large
Bank Capital Requirements, Which will be Effective on October 1 (Aug. 10, 2020)
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200810a.htm
[https://perma.cc/P8MU-HZFE] [hereinafter Large Bank Capital Requirements].
103. Id.; see also What is Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1)?, CORP. FIN. INST. (last visited
Sept.
12,
2020,
10:35AM),
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/common-equity-tier-1cet1/ [https://perma.cc/F5NF-4Q5L] (defining the minimum capital requirement as a metric
calculated by dividing the firm’s tier 1 capital—such as cash and stocks—by its total assets).
104. Large Bank Capital Requirements, supra note 102 (stating the updated requirements
for larger banks as well as establishing a timeline for response); see also The Capital Buffers
in
Basel
III,
BANK
FOR
INT’L
SETTLEMENTS
(Nov.
28,
2019),
https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsisummaries/b3_capital.htm [https://perma.cc/7NRV-ZF4Y] (“The
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banks also serve as global systemically important banks (“G-SIBs”)105
and are required to keep a capital surcharge of at least 1.0%.106 This
surcharge requires G-SIBs to maintain an additional capital supply to
protect from losses and harsh economic scenarios. 107
C.

The Third Test of 2020: The Mid-Cycle Stress Test

In addition to the February 2020 stress test and the new sensitivity
analysis conducted from February to June 2020, the Federal Reserve
Board released another test to measure the uncertainty imposed by the
COVID-19 pandemic.108 The Federal Reserve Board created this firstof-its-kind test, released in September 2020, to better analyze the capital
strength and resiliency of the big banks throughout the COVID-19
pandemic.109 This mid-cycle stress test, similar to the February 2020
stress test, measures two different types of hypothetical scenarios:
severely adverse and alternative severe. 110 The severely adverse scenario
consists of an unemployment rate peak of 12.5% and then a decline to
7.5% through the end of 2021.111 The model also includes a 3% decline
in gross domestic product from the third quarter of 2020 to the end of
2021.112 The alternative severe scenario, on the other hand, records a
slow decline in the unemployment rate from 11% to 9% through to the
end of 2021, and a gross domestic product that drops 2.5% from the third

capital conservation buffer was introduced to ensure that banks have an additional layer of
usable capital that can be drawn down when losses are incurred.”).
105. Global Systemically Important Bank, RISK.NET,
https://www.risk.net/definition/global-systemically-important-bank-g-sib
[https://perma.cc/QRE2-TQK6] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (defining G-SIB as a bank
whose systemic risk profile is of such importance that its failure could trigger a global
economic crisis).
106. Large Bank Capital Requirements, supra note 102.
107. Id.
108. Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Releases Hypothetical
Scenarios for Second Round of Bank Stress Tests (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200917a.htm
[https://perma.cc/A6GK-75Q2] [hereinafter Second Round of Bank Stress Tests].
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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to the fourth quarter of 2020.113 The results of the mid-cycle stress test
were released in December 2020.114
IV. CCAR AND DFAST IN 2020: HOW COVID-19 COULD INFLUENCE
THE FUTURE OF STRESS TESTING
The COVID-19 pandemic served as the first true test of CCAR
and DFAST in a moment of crisis.115 However, the new sensitivity
analysis created a sense of confusion about the process and raised
questions about the original purpose of stress tests.116
A.

The New Sensitivity Analysis: Lack of Transparency

The delayed switch to the new sensitivity analysis raised a variety
of criticisms.117 In addition to the confusion and the unclear, aggregate
release of the banks’ results for the new sensitivity analysis, critics raised
concern about the lack of public disclosure.118 While the Federal Reserve
Board still released bank-specific information for the severely adverse
scenario, that scenario had a maximum unemployment rate of 10%. 119
Meanwhile, U.S. unemployment rate had already reached 10.2% in July
2020, with some individual states even reaching 16%.120
The new sensitivity analysis stated that while many banks
remained well-capitalized under the V-shaped model, several banks
would reach their minimum capital levels under both the U-shaped and
W-shaped model.121 This lack of transparency is exactly what SCAP, in

113. Second Round of Bank Stress Tests, supra note 108.
114. Id; see also Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Releases Second

Round of Bank Stress Test Results (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20201218b.htm
[https://perma.cc/LC4B-2CSV] (detailing the results of the second stress test, which showed
that the banks were strongly capitalized when faced with the alternative severe and severely
adverse scenarios).
115. See Blackwell, supra note 12 (stating how Dodd-Frank will likely be impacted by the
economic wave that COVID-19 will have on the banking system).
116. See Tarullo, supra note 14 (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve
Board’s confusing 2020 release of bank stress tests).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020 Stress Test Exercises, supra note 65.
120. Quarles, supra note 67; see also Unemployment Rate 16.1 Percent in Massachusetts,
supra note 67 (stating the sharp rise in unemployment due to COVID-19).
121. Additional Sensitivity Analyses, supra note 88.
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response to the 2008 Financial crisis, sought to avoid.122 SCAP helped
to restore confidence and credibility in the U.S. banking system by being
transparent with market participants and consumers, which reduced fears
about the possible collapse of the banks and U.S. economy.123 Some
argued that the Federal Reserve Board refused to publicly disclose the
sensitivity results because the analysis was an escape mechanism from
negatively impacting the markets out of fear from the stress test
scenarios. 124 If the results were publicly disclosed, the Federal Reserve
Board would have sent negative signals about the soundness of large
banks.125 However, this lack of transparency raises even more concerns
to market participants and consumers than what might have occurred if
the results were fully disclosed.126 For example, the transparency and
public disclosure of the SCAP program restored confidence in the U.S.
economy by being honest with the American people, whereas hiding the
financial standing of the big banks, even if strong, could reasonably lead
to the conclusion that the Federal Reserve Board wanted to avoid the
public disclosure of the results to obscure the fact that certain banks were
struggling to meet minimum capital standards. 127
Vice Chair for Supervision, Randal Quarles, supported the lack
of disclosure associated with new sensitivity analysis in light of COVID19.128 He characterized the new scenarios as simply scenarios and not an
official stress test, as they did not follow the normal protocol used for the
annual stress tests.129 Therefore, the public disclosure element often
associated with the stress test was absent, raising both concern and
confusion about the state of the U.S. banking system during COVID19.130 In support of the new sensitivity analysis, Vice Chair Quarles’ June

122. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6.
123. Id.
124. Tarullo, supra note 14.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6; see also Tarullo, supra note 14 (noting the impacts

stemming from the Federal Reserve Board’s confusing 2020 release of bank stress tests).
128. See Quarles, supra note 67 (stating that the sensitivity analysis was not a stress test
because the Federal Reserve Board did not publicly disclose the results and the scenarios were
more in line with the forecast of the current economy instead of hypothetical scenarios).
129. Quarles, supra note 67.
130. See id. (detailing his opinion on the new adjustments to stress testing and the current
stability of the banks).
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2020 speech defended several aspects of the process.131 He noted that
while COVID-19 upended the United States economy and markets, the
banks remained strong.132 Compared to the 2008 Financial Crisis, big
banks entered the COVID-19 pandemic with high levels of capital and
liquidity.133
Vice Chair Quarles also defended the unorthodox release of the
sensitivity analysis,134 noting that the Federal Reserve Board chose not
to follow the normal public disclosure process for stress tests because of
the need for timely analysis.135 For example, the Federal Reserve Board
avoided completely recalculating capital plans and instead made slight
adjustments to the involved banks’ balance sheets to yield a more
reasonable forecast in light of the current pandemic. 136 Additionally, the
sensitivity analysis reflected current economic forecasts influenced from
COVID-19, rather than the normal hypothetical scenarios associated with
the stress tests.137 In defending the aggregate release of information, Vice
Chair Quarles stated that the purpose was to understand “the performance
of the banking system as a whole; we did not provide any firm with firmspecific results nor are we publicly disclosing firm-specific results.”138
He ended his statement by concluding that the Federal Reserve Board
would actively monitor the conditions of the banks in the coming
months.139
B.

A Waste of Time and Resources

Another general concern raised about the release of the sensitivity
analysis was why the Federal Reserve Board would make the banks go
through with testing hypothetical scenarios released in February 2020 and
release results in June of that same year while simultaneously conducting
another sensitivity analysis.140 As a CCAR testing cycle takes several
131. See id. (discussing how Quarles referred to the new sensitivity analysis as “not a stress
test” and thus the lack of public disclosure was allowed).
132. Id.
133. See id. (stating that the thirty-four banks that participated in the sensitivity analysis
had in aggregate $1.2 trillion in common equity and $3.3 trillion in high quality assets).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Quarles, supra note 67.
140. Tarullo, supra note 14.
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months to complete, the Federal Reserve Board could have paused the
2020 test between the months of February and the June deadline to adjust
the test to more relevant economic figures. 141 In addition, the Federal
Reserve Board released yet another stress test in September 2020, which
only furthers this argument.142 In 2009, SCAP worked because the
Federal Reserve Board stopped current testing and reevaluated with
metrics that were more in tune with the economic crisis.143 Therefore,
the 2020 response of the Federal Reserve Board raises the question as to
why the same approach was not taken here.144 In its release, the Federal
Reserve Board stated that the sensitivity analysis will help judge whether
banks would have enough capital if economic and financial conditions
were to worsen, but that is exactly the function of stress tests.145 If the
Federal Reserve Board was unsure as to what metrics to use to reflect the
uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic, releasing a detailed analysis that
may not have been wholly accurate would have undermined the
credibility of the entire stress test process and reduced confidence in the
Federal Reserve Board.146
Some critics argue that the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the
flaws in both DFAST and CCAR, and thus call for the end of the
programs.147 This argument especially holds true for 2020, when banks
still were required to prepare capital plans by June for a stress test model
released in February that did not reflect the uncertainly of the economy
due to COVID-19.148 Managers spent time providing internal results of
the stress tests when they could have been serving customers or allocating
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also Second Round of Bank Stress Tests, supra note 108 (noting how the

Federal Reserve Board released another stress test in addition to the one earlier in the year
and the new sensitivity analysis).
143. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6.
144. See Tarullo, supra note 14 (“Faced with this, the Fed had three options. First, it
could shift gears quickly by substituting a COVID-informed stress scenario for the stale one.
Second, it could suspend the dated stress test until markets stabilized and then recommence
with an updated scenario. Third, it could soldier on with its original test, ignoring the
potential impact of COVID on bank earnings and losses.”).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve Board’s confusing
2020 release of bank stress-tests); see also Hugh Carney, Stress Tests for Midsize Banks are
More Trouble Than They’re Worth, AM. BANKER (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/stress-tests-for-midsize-banks-are-more-troublethan-theyre-worth [https://perma.cc/3WLW-XS4C] (discussing how stress tests burden
midsize bank and how one solution would be to call the end the programs).

314

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

their time elsewhere in the bank. 149 Additionally, DFAST imposes
significant costs on smaller to mid-size banks around the $10 billion
threshold.150 These banks must produce thousands of documents and
spend over 10,000 in compliance with stress tests, which in turn imposes
a heavier burden on smaller to mid-size banks.151
Conversely, the preparatory process has strengthened the capital
of big banks over time.152 In 2020, the thirty-four banks involved in the
annual stress test entered the pandemic with higher levels of capital and
liquidity than during the 2008 Financial Crisis, indicating a safer lending
regime and showing that banks have better conserved their capital over
time.153 Additionally, when the stress tests are transparent with market
participants and the American people, as demonstrated through SCAP,
disclosing stress tests ultimately ensures trust and credibility within the
markets.154
C.

The Global Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic: What Has
Worked in Other Countries?

The European Banking Authority (“EBA”) took a different
approach to stress testing in response to COVID-19. 155 The EBA chose
to postpone EU-wide stress testing until 2021, relieving pressure on the
banking system.156 In addition, the EBA also postponed supervisory
visits throughout 2020 and removed deadlines for reporting data to
further this relief.157 This decision will allow banks to focus more on
their core operations, such as support for their customers. 158 However,
the EBA will still carry out an EU-wide transparency exercise in order to
149. Carney, supra note 148.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Quarles, supra note 67.
153. Id.
154. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6.
155. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting the decrease in capital requirements

instilled by the EU’s decision to postpone stress testing in light of the pandemic); cf. Tarullo,
supra note 14 (critiquing how the Federal Reserve Board instituted more burdens and stress
tests/analyses on U.S. banks during COVID-19).
156. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting how the EBA’s decision to reduce
regulatory burdens should help banks focus on more important services, such as with their
customers).
157. Id.
158. See id. (discussing how the EBA’s decision to remove burdens on banks during
COVID-19 allows for the banks to better allocate their time to deal with customer needs).
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provide updated information on banks’ exposures and asset quality to
participants in the market.159 This transparency exercise, which has been
an annual analysis conducted by the EBA dating back to 2011, includes
data collected by the EBA from 129 banks across twenty-six countries.160
The report releases the assets, liabilities, exposures, and asset quality of
the banks involved to create transparency with the markets. 161 In 2020,
the EBA conducted both a spring and fall exercise which only looked at
supervisory reporting data, reducing any additional burdens for banks
during the COVID-19 pandemic.162
The EBA is also allowing banks to operate below their required
capital level buffer to continue to finance households and corporations
experiencing complications due to the COVID-19 pandemic.163 To aid
in this financing, the European Central Bank (“ECB”) has increased
lending to these banks through their Pandemic Emergency Purchase
Programme (“PEPP”), which includes the purchasing of bonds from
banks to free up room for more lending to business and households.164
These adjustments in response to a financial crisis help to free banks from
the regulatory burden of complying with stress tests during the pandemic,
and instead allows the banks to instead focus their efforts on their
customers and the economy.165
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? REFORM AND OTHER SUGGESTIONS TO
THE CHANGING ROLE OF STRESS TESTING
While some critics push for the demise of the CCAR and DFAST
programs, they fail to acknowledge that CCAR and DFAST have resulted
in banks preserving capital to be better prepared for periods of economic

159. Id.
160. 2020

EU-wide Transparency Exercise, EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH.,
https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-transparency-exercise
[https://perma.cc/22WW-FQ35] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting the decrease in capital requirements
instilled by the EU’s decision to postpone stress testing in light of the pandemic).
164. See Our Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK (2020),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/search/coronavirus/html/index.en.html
[https://perma.cc/GJ4W-BUME] (last visited Jan. 4, 2021) (providing detail on the ECB’s
PEPP program to help banks during the COVID-19 crisis).
165. Jones & Canepa, supra note 15.
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crisis like that experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic.166 The
critique of these tests, instead, is centered on the lack of consistent
procedural standards for stress testing during a financial crisis.167 In
releasing the new sensitivity analysis, the Federal Reserve Board
retreated from the values of public disclosure and transparency and
moved towards a vague sensitivity analysis.168 The 2009 SCAP response
restored confidence in the banks by being clear and honest about their
capital state.169 As discussed, banks that initially failed the stress test
were given one month to devise a new capital plan and six months to raise
the necessary capital to satisfy it.170 Due to the new 2020 sensitivity
analysis, however, the thirty-four banks were required to meet new
capital requirements by October 1, 2020, giving the banks only three full
months to reanalyze their capital plans. 171 This rushed process only led
to more confusion and added pressure to the banks during an already
stressful pandemic.172
In addition to revisiting the success of the SCAP response, the
Federal Reserve Board should also seek influence from the EBA.173 By
postponing the 2020 stress tests to the following year, the EBA relieved
added constraints of EU-wide banks and allowed them to better allocate
their resources to their customers. 174 To maintain a sense of transparency,
the EBA still planned to carry out EU-wide exercises to reveal the asset
quality and exposures of the banks.175 Finally, the EBA allowed their
banks to fall below their capital requirements, utilizing the buffers in
place to continue lending to households and corporations while
166. See Tarullo, supra note 14 (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve
Board’s confusing 2020 release of bank stress-tests); but see Clark & Ryu, supra note 6
(providing a detailed history on the creation of CCAR, DFAST, and SCAP).
167. Tarullo, supra note 14.
168. See id. (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve Board’s confusing
2020 release of bank stress tests); but see Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (stating how the
transparency of SCAP helped to restore confidence between market participants and the U.S.
banking system).
169. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (noting how the transparency of SCAP helped to restore
confidence between market participants and the banks).
170. Id.
171. See Large Bank Capital Requirements, supra note 102 (stating the updated
requirements for larger banks as well as establishing a timeline for response).
172. Tarullo, supra note 14.
173. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting how the EU’s decision to postpone stress
testing in light of the pandemic decreased capital requirements).
174. See id. (“The EBA said that some capital buffers have been designed for use during a
downturn to ensure continued lending to the economy.”).
175. Id.
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additionally receiving support from the ECB. 176 This relief, in addition
to the continued transparency between the banks and EU market
participants, could serve as a simpler, clearer process for CCAR and
DFAST for future economic crises.177
The SCAP response showed that in times of crisis, transparency
is key.178 One of the main purposes of SCAP was to publicly disclose the
results of the stress tests to create a mode of transparency between banks,
market participants, and the American people. 179 By disregarding this
approach, the new sensitivity analysis has lost a piece of the original
purpose of stress tests.180 To save additional resources for the thirty-four
banks,181 the Federal Reserve Board should have reevaluated their
response during a time of economic crisis.182 After the Federal Reserve
Board released the February 2020 stress test scenarios, aimed to be
completed only in June 2020, the Federal Reserve Board should have
halted the test in March to recalibrate new scenarios that better reflected
the metrics of the COVID-19 pandemic.183 This adjustment would have
given the banks a month to develop a new plan similar to what happened
with SCAP.184
VI. CONCLUSION
Within the span of twelve years, the United States economy has
faced two financial crises.185 In 2008, the collapse of the housing market
176. Id.; Our Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic, supra note 164.
177. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting the decrease in capital requirements

instilled by the EU’s decision to postpone stress testing in light of the pandemic); see also
Tarullo, supra note 14 (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve Board’s
confusing 2020 release of bank stress-tests).
178. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6.
179. Id.
180. Id.; see also Additional Sensitivity Analyses, supra note 88 (stating the results of both
the 2020 stress tests and the additional sensitivity analysis).
181. See Carney, supra note 148 (detailing the many adjustments needed for Dodd-Frank
to be as effective as intended).
182. See Tarullo, supra note 14 (suggesting that the Federal Reserve Board should have
reevaluated their metrics and paused the initial stress test to better align with the market
factors and risks of COVID-19).
183. Id.; see Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting the decrease in capital requirements
instilled by the EU’s decision to postpone stress testing in light of the pandemic).
184. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (providing a detailed history on the creation of CCAR,
DFAST, and SCAP).
185. See ERIN COGHLAN, supra note 24 (discussing the factors that led to the 2008 financial
crisis); see also Hauck, supra note 68 (providing a detailed timeline of the evolution of
COVID-19 and its impact on the United States).
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led to the 2008 Financial Crisis, resulting in the failure of over 450
commercial banks across the country as well as a spiked unemployment
rate of 10%.186 In 2020, the United States faced the COVID-19
pandemic, leading to unemployment spikes of 16% in some states.187
The Federal Reserve Board Board’s response to each financial
crisis, however, led to adverse results. 188 In 2009, with the development
of the SCAP stress tests, the Federal Reserve Board allowed big banks to
have one month to develop a capital plan and six months to adequately
raise that capital.189 While there were many benefits to these sudden
regulatory requirements, the most important was the public disclosure of
the stress test results.190 The public disclosure requirement helped to
rebuild trust in the U.S. economy by allowing market participants to learn
of the financial standing of the banks.191
In 2020, however, the Federal Reserve Board required thirtyfour big banks involved in the annual stress tests to not only comply with
an outdated stress test that had been exceeded by the economic conditions
of COVID-19, but also comply with a new, vague sensitivity analysis,
and a second annual stress test.192 The sensitivity analysis, classified to
not be a stress test, allowed the Federal Reserve Board to evade the public
disclosure requirement with normal stress tests.193 At the same time, the
EBA postponed stress tests for 2020, allowing banks to delve into their
capital buffers to meet customer requests and relieving regulatory visits
until 2021.194

186. See Labaton, supra note 22 (providing an overview of how the five big banks abused
the relaxation of the net capital requirement); see also ERIN COGHLAN, supra note 24
(discussing the collapse of the housing market that led to the 2008 financial crisis).
187. Unemployment Rate 16.1 Percent in Massachusetts, supra note 67.
188. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (noting how the successful implementation of SCAP
restored confidence in the U.S. banking system); see also Tarullo, supra note 14 (“Why, then,
in the face of an unprecedented economic situation and the powerful precedent of the 2009
SCAP, didn’t the Fed quickly pivot to a meaningful stress scenario, require resubmission of
banks’ capital plans, and suspend dividend distributions to preserve capital in the interim until
more was known?”).
189. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Tarullo, supra note 14; see also Second Round of Bank Stress Tests, supra note 108
(discussing the released of a mid-cycle stress test).
193. See Quarles, supra note 67 (detailing his opinion on the new adjustments to stress
testing and the current stability of the banks).
194. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting the decrease in capital requirements
instilled by the EBA’s decision to postpone stress testing in light of the pandemic).
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The Federal Reserve Board’s 2020 response to the COVID-19
pandemic shows a deviation from the success of SCAP in 2009.195 By
allowing for this deviation, critics have raised concerns about the
credibility of the stress tests and the Federal Reserve Board as a whole,
leading to a variety of misguided conclusions about the state of the U.S.
banking system due to the lack of transparency with the public.196 Going
forward, the Federal Reserve Board should revert to the more flexible
SCAP procedures instead of the rigid adherence to a stress testing cycle
and sporadic, non-public testing, while also considering the global
response when faced with a future economic crisis. 197
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195. Compare Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (detailing how SCAP helped to restore trust in
the U.S. banking system), with Tarullo, supra note 14 (discussing the vague and confusing
release of the 2020 sensitivity analysis).
196. Tarullo, supra note 14 (“Although the stale stress test results have been released to
the public on a bank-by-bank basis as usual, the results of the sensitivity analysis have been
released to the public only in the aggregate, with some ranges indicating how many banks
may fall into certain categories of projected losses. So we have full information about a largely
irrelevant stress test, but limited information about the relevant analysis.”)
197. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (detailing how SCAP helped to restore confidence in the
U.S. banking system through transparency and flexible time frames that allowed banks to
reevaluate, build, and better manage their capital); see also Jones & Canepa, supra note 15
(discussing how the EBA imposed less burdensome measures on EU-wide banks during the
stress of COVID-19).
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